Introduction Why Patterns of Restraint
The United States military must effectively apply present knowledge as well as past cultural lessons in armed conflict to identify cultural patterns of restraint with new adversaries like the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also referred to as ISIS or ISIL). To do this successfully, those engaged in conflict must first identify the existing patterns of restraint. Past encounters, both contemporary and historical, will provide lessons on how these notions of restraint may change after first contact and as the conflict develops. If we can successfully identify these notions, we can then begin to understand how to defend against them, adapt to them, or exploit them to achieve the objective without compromising our own notions.
Patterns of restraint can differ vastly from culture to culture. In conflict, acceptable behavior, or rules of engagement, for one society may be vastly opposed to the traditional values of the opponent's culture. As conflict emerges, a change in tactics and notions of restraint occurs on both sides. Such tactics within asymmetric warfare can greatly affect the outcome of conflict based on the perceived cultural values and patterns of restraint in combat on both sides. The significance of comprehending what these notions are at the start of hostilities and how they may change is vital to understanding the opponent's true restraint.
Reciprocity and Rationality
Concepts of reciprocity and a rational, mutual respect for similar norms motivate conflicting groups to respect the rules of conflict they choose. This is one reason why international treaties receive support from states. Reciprocity provides the basis for this respect and adherence to a pattern of restraint. We can expect rational opponents to retaliate in kind based on their actions. If unequally matched, retaliation will be asymmetric and play to the strengths and weaknesses of the parties involved. This is the case between states with different economic and military capabilities, or with revolutionary movements, insurgencies, and terrorist organizations. The concept of reciprocity involves both competition and cooperation so long as all parties involved in conflict have an interest to avoid common costs and to obtain common benefits. 1 Reciprocity amongst rational actors provides a basis for codified patterns of restraint amongst almost any social structure. If antagonists do not appear to have similar cost or benefit concerns, as is the case with insurgent groups, terrorist organizations, and in irregular warfare, then the social structure becomes the common ground, specifically, their rational interaction with cultural roles, norms, active and inactive populations, and concepts of restraint. Maintaining these values serves to show legitimacy to the noncombatant population. Rational actors need not
have similar values to their opponents, only logical outcomes based on their ideology.
Methodology and Limitations of the Study
The research methodology is a qualitative analysis though case studies using primary and secondary source materials. Sources focus on primary source materials such as relevant historical accounts, interviews with subject matter experts, and current event articles from prominent news sources. Incorporating secondary source material from peer-reviewed sources provides background information and expands on arguments. Case studies serve as a basis to identify patterns, change in those patterns during conflict, and potential reasons for the change.
This research paper will focus on the research question. However, given the diversity of options in analysis of patterns of restraint and change, this paper will avoid expanding too broadly. Specifically, it will avoid extensive discussion of ethical or moral reasoning, individual or group think acts, or a study of insurgency and asymmetric warfare. The analysis will touch on these topics as part of the exploration of patterns of restraint and how they may change, but only if germane to the discussion.
Case Studies Identifying Patterns of Restraint, Changes, and Reasons Why
Case studies serve to help identify patterns of restraint, changes that occurred, and may allude to why the changes occurred. Framing historical examples in terms of the United States' involvement with another antagonist will provide a common thread and helps focus the analysis of the second party on a country, region, specific insurgent group, or specific terrorist organization. Contemporary examples focus on local insurgencies that were or are destabilizing a region, specifically the Tamil Tigers, Chechen separatists, and the Islamic State (ISIS). The
United States interaction serves as a tie to provide one of the common threads for the analysis.
Finally, people provide another common thread, specifically, identifying social groups that are disenfranchised, hopeless, mercenaries, or radicalized. 
United States Patterns of Restraint

ISIS Patterns of Restraint
The self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) demonstrates clear patterns of restraint. They are evident through codified norms, enforcement through standardized punishment, and observed through their much-publicized actions. ISIS also demonstrates rational actions based on their own norms of behavior, more specifically they have predictable behaviors. These notions of restraint also appear to follow the concept of reciprocity in that they show restraint when the threat of retaliation would undermine their goals. Before discussing the potential patterns of restraint of ISIS, it is vital to frame this opposing force appropriately.
ISIS is a group exploiting cultural grievances and political turmoil in both Iraq and Syria to impose a rigid, literal religious view of Islam and hold territory in the region through military action and control of the population. They have established their own governance in occupied territory to support their efforts and have declared their own caliphate to attempt to garner legitimacy as well as regional and global support. Their end-state is to firmly establish a regional caliphate without specified borders, govern the population under their strict ideology, and influence the global Islamic community under these values.
ISIS is not simply a terrorist group. Approaching it this way will overlook norms and notions of restraint that do not apply to global terror networks like al-Qaeda and unwittingly enable ISIS information campaigns against opposing forces. ISIS has demonstrated themselves as a highly organized and competent organization with specific leadership structure and goals.
They are waging a hot revolutionary war while attempting to act with an orthodox pattern to insurgency warfare by overthrowing the existing order with intent to transform the entire region.
A "hot revolutionary war" is when the insurgent engages in openly violent and illegal activity and is the opposite of a "cold revolutionary war" where the insurgent activity remains legal and nonviolent. 8 Cold revolutionary warfare exists before the transition from peace to war and commonly occurs through political reform or transformation. An "orthodox pattern" refers to insurgency warfare that seeks to overthrow the existing order with intent to transform the entire region and is the opposite of the "bourgeois-nationalist pattern" which focuses on blind and eventually selective terrorism to achieve near term objectives. 9 The 13 This sexual violence "isn't just a physical indulgence or a manifestation of battlefield brutality; it's a deliberate, calculated strategy" and serves to justify their faith. 14 ISIS promotes this type of sexual violence and slavery in their literature "as a way to keep men from falling into adultery" and not conforming to this viewpoint would be "apostatizing Islam." 15 ISIS fighters do not reserve slavery as only a social punishment. It also serves economic purposes through human trafficking. 16 These economic practices as well as the other methods of funding the ISIS cause also serve as observable patterns of restraint. ISIS has strong financial capability beyond foreign donors.
They seize and loot from occupied territory, impose taxes, and smuggle oil from facilities in Iraq and Syria. 17 Without revenue and a social organization to manage it, they could not carry out enforcement and expansion operations, which further demonstrate their ability to act rationally based on their long-term goals. Sexual violence and economics are not their only observable patterns. Killing, subjectification, and how they go about doing it is a crucial tool that ISIS uses to enforce rule, punish violations, and promote their cause.
Under the extreme ISIS concept of "takfiri doctrine," they are committing to a plan of purification by killing large numbers of people. 18 Takfiri for ISIS is the excommunication and purging of infidels, or kuffar. The group's strict adherence to a prophetic methodology includes beheading, slavery, and crucifixion, all punishments specified in the Koran. 19 Nothing is selectively left out as evident by the fact that Christians in ISIS occupied territory can escape death by paying a tax, or jizya as referred to in Islamic law. 20 To members and supporters of ISIS, these actions are "policies of mercy rather than of brutality." 21 They see these tactics as part of a greater information campaign in their war strategy to elicit fear in their opponents and avoid prolonged conflict. These actions also serve to demonstrate the resolve of ISIS and show them as a credible force in the region. ISIS chose to declare themselves a caliphate only after meeting the minimum criteria set forth in Islamic teaching and reinforced their resolve through "mass executions and public crucifixions" to remove any doubt about their conviction. 22 While the use of sexual violence, killing, and subjectification by ISIS may seem macabre to observers, their strict adherence to the medieval traditions demonstrates a level of commitment and continuity by ISIS to its norms, rules, and restraints making their behavior predictable.
The human element that composes ISIS ranks deserves attention before leading into possible changes in patterns of restraint and their reasons why. ISIS is primarily comprised of three social groups. As Graeme Wood wrote in The New Republic, these three groups are the "Psychopaths," the "True Believers," and the "Sunni Pragmatists." 23 In the first group, the "psychopaths," comprise the hyper-violent foreign fighters along with the more practical indigenous fighters. The second group, the "true believers," comprises of both foreign and indigenous people that may be disaffected and as a result, they identify with the ideology. The third group of pragmatists is the largest part of the ISIS population. This is the primary population of ISIS controlled territory. They are the source of ground combatants, logistics, and support. This group also includes the tribal sheikhs who support ISIS because it is practical to support the occupying force when there is no other option. The alliances within the third social group are subject to uncertainty and if another opposing force presents a better option this could sway their allegiance. In a military assessment of these local alliances, the tribal groups have historically been comfortable with secularism and if Sharia law were to replace tribal law, this may upset the alliance and cause internal struggle. 
Discussion of Historical and Contemporary Examples of Conflicting Patterns of Restraint
The following case studies focus on a few examples of historical and contemporary conflicts where two groups with very different patterns of restraint came into contact. These case studies serve the purpose of providing a background on patterns of restraint, changes in those patterns after conflict, and the reasons why. Common threads among the groups are state versus non-state actors or local insurgencies that have regional destabilizing effects. United
States interactions and the interactions of disenfranchised social groups will serve as threads.
This analysis is essential for evaluating the patterns of restraint and shifts amongst the groups.
Native American and Euro-American Conflict in the 1500-1800s
Native American cultures exhibited a number of traditional patterns of restraint codified in similar ways to previous discussion. Wayne E. Lee's article "Peace Chiefs and Blood
Revenge: Patterns of Restraint in Native American Warfare" focuses on North American native people from roughly the years 1500-1800 and provides a thorough analysis of these patterns.
This is also the only source that the author if this paper could find on the topic of patterns of restraint in conflict outside of course elective discussion. Key influences to patterns of restraint were logistics, religion, culture, and social structure or leadership. Ceremony as part of the preconflict preparation served to temper the frequency of conflict as well as provide structure to it.
Notably, tribes had three cultural leaders in the form of a peace chief (political), war chief 
The Pawnee Experience and Native-American Conflict
An iconic reference to Native American warfare was the taking of scalps. While it may seem macabre at face value, this practice reveals a great deal about restraint in Native American warfare and illuminates a practice not culturally similar in the Euro-American experience.
Scalping by the Pawnee was culturally significant and sometimes overshadowed by political and economic factors. For the Pawnee, scalping was akin to life power and the sacrificial burning of scalps was a norm. For other tribes, scalping was simply a trophy and commodity. Both speak to social and ceremonial aspects of life. These rituals were the source of spiritual and social power as well as status. Other tribes attributed diplomatic and economic power to this practice.
Rules of the war honor system dictated the importance of the scalp based on the tribe. It was not always the highest priority for honor and most of the time close enemy contact was higher in the war honor system. To this effect, the Pawnee planned war campaigns to achieve these honors.
However, the sophisticated social structure of the Pawnee drove a logistical difference in war parties. They planned for two types of expeditions: one for horses (resources) and one for scalps (symbolic). 34 One involved combat and death while the other planned to avoid it. This demonstrates a clear pattern of restraint based on resource and spiritual requirements and highlights a mainstay in Pawnee social and religious daily life.
This practice, the social structure surrounding it, and the spiritual significance for the Pawnee demonstrate how we can observe clear patterns of restraint in a practice that is culturally incompatible with western society yet based on rational behavior such as resource needs or spiritual rites. The Pawnee held on to this custom into modern times, transformed from physical scalps to modern headgear, as a spiritual rite of passage in their war honor system. This case shows how resilience in culture can overcome change in patterns of restraint and protect the social structure from compromise or outside influence.
The Iroquois and the Five Nations
The Iroquois and the Five Nations practiced the "mourning-war," a custom unique in the Euro-American experience. Participation in war was the benchmark in an Iroquois' experience and conferred status and success. The mourning-war was warfare stemming from a loss (death by any cause) significant enough in the family and social group to drive the need to go to war, whether there was an antagonist or not. The conflict would result in prisoners for adoption by the grieving members to replace their lost family members. Those prisoners not adopted were ceremonially tortured and killed. These war tactics and culture were markedly different motives to the colonial Europeans.
The mourning-war began a devastating cycle when the Iroquois suffered losses from 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, 1976-2009
The Tamil people in Sri Lanka were an ethnic cultural group that sought independence.
The movement sparked both a cold and hot revolution with an insurgency chiefly led by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or Tamil Tigers. As with many groups undermatched compared to their opponent, they resorted to asymmetric warfare. While cultural, social, and religious factors played on both sides of this conflict, the Tamil Tigers goal was a secular independent state. 36 The Tamil Tigers were an organized force with a clear goal. They procured funding from controlled territory and through donor support from the local population and diaspora. As an insurgent group, the Tamil Tigers conducted a hot revolutionary war that transitioned back and forth from an orthodox pattern to a bourgeois-nationalist pattern over time as counterinsurgency operations continued. Moreover, the Tamil Tigers had a military organization, to include ground and sea forces.
The LTTE has some very distinct changes in patterns of restraint that terrorist groups and under-matched insurgencies globally have emulated. Research suggests that the Tamil Tigers invented the suicide vest and are the only terrorist group to have successfully assassinated two world leaders using this tactic. 37 They fully employed suicide tactics in both asymmetric military attacks and for political statements, carrying cyanide capsules visibly for use over capture. Perhaps more notable than the invention of the suicide vest was the Birds of Paradise.
They were women LTTE members that served equally in combatant roles as their male counterparts. 38 This gender-neutral voluntary involvement is a unique social structure to LTTE and rare to other secular insurgent and terrorist movements. 39 The change in restraint, specifically the adaptation of gender roles, provided the Tamil Tigers with a powerful asymmetric weapon and ability to exploit gender bias weaknesses in Sri Lanka and India military counterinsurgency campaigns. However, the advantage met with conflict when the new tactic threatened to alienate supporters that did not agree with it. Why the change occurred is most likely due to "direct and indirect state repression." 40 This pushed disenfranchised women toward an active role in the cause. Over the years, the LTTE changed their patterns of restraint and adapted those changes over the evolution of their movement. Ultimately, they were unsuccessful toward their goals due to military and government counterinsurgency efforts.
Chechen Separatists and the Black Widows, 1999-2011
The Chechen separatist rebels were Muslim and saw the Russia government as Revenge rules dictate avenging murder with murder and only males may avenge unless there are no males in the family to do it. 42 Women involved with the killing are a change in this pattern of restraint. Nevertheless, despite this difference, employing the Black Widows as an asymmetric warfare advantage in Russia effectively exploited traditional gender biases and penetrated weakness in Russian fronts. This is only capable through organization rather than straight terrorism. There existed a social structure, specifically leadership, within the Chechen separatists' organizations that "capitalizes on the bombers' grievances and channels them strategically." 43 Without this leadership, the separatist movement employing this change in restraint could not function.
Analysis and Evaluation Groups That Changed Their Patterns of Restraint after Engagement or Contact
All groups discussed have notable instances where they changed their notions of restraint 
Comparisons with Case Studies and ISIS
There are a striking number of similarities and a distinct difference between the LTTE and ISIS in patterns of restraint and organization. The Tamil Tigers were an organized force with a clear goal, much like ISIS. They procured funding from controlled territory and through donors like ISIS. As mentioned before, the Tamil Tigers transitioned back and forth from an orthodox pattern to a bourgeois-nationalist pattern of fighting over time as counterinsurgency operations continued. ISIS demonstrates a similar pattern, but they have not been operating as long as the LTTE had so it is entirely possibly they will follow a similar trend. Moreover, the insurgencies. Adherence to traditional social roles, in this case gender, would also appear to be precedents for unanimous support of the active minority in the population.
Discussion of Issues, Counter-Arguments, and/or Challenges
Lack of Real Information on the Islamic State's Cultural Group Identity or Patterns of Restraint
There is a large amount of material on current events through mainstream news sources providing a glimpse into the self-proclaimed Islamic State's (ISIS) patterns of restraint.
However, this information derives largely from interviews with internally displaced populations, supporters from outside, some ISIS members, military operations, and, most dubiously, the ISIS public affairs campaign. Research for this paper focused largely around western news sources and unclassified military sources, but even those sources at some point had to use potential propaganda material from ISIS to answer questions. Ultimately, the evaluation that ISIS is showing distinct patterns of restraint and behaving rationally (predictably) based on these patterns is an assessment based on unclassified news and military reporting from an author that is unable to "see it for himself." This trust in reporting has with it the inherent challenge of misevaluating the true group identity and patterns of restraint. Only further development and a continuing military and diplomatic engagement within the region will illuminate if this evaluation is accurate. 
U.S. Military or International Efforts towards Addressing ISIS
Exploiting Patterns of Restraint without Compromising Our Own Values
To degrade and ultimately destroy an ideology is ludicrous in modern society. This would require the complete elimination (annihilation warfare) of the ideology, which is impossible. You cannot suppress an idea. There will always be an active minority in the population that empathizes with the ideology. Elimination of the active minority would require high resources, potential moral comprises, and a long-term commitment that could disenfranchise the population's neutral majority and possibly bring them around to the cause you are trying to eliminate. 
Recommendations
This paper concludes that the United States military needs to identify patterns of restraint prior to the start of hostilities in order to prepare for their effects, identity vulnerabilities that could be exploited, and protect friendly vulnerabilities that the opposing force could exploit.
Recommendations with the ISIS conflict include exploiting changes in leadership, gender roles, and social structure.
Exploiting change in leadership is a potential opportunity. ISIS is basing their leadership selection on a strict ideology. As mentioned before, ISIS has chosen to declare a caliphate and beliefs, there will only be twelve caliphs before the apocalypse, with Baghdadi as the eight. 47 Removing one leader may allow ISIS to use this belief as a recruiting and propaganda tool.
However, if the group's leadership elite compromises and ascends someone that is not a claimed descendent of the Prophet, this could be used to disorganize ISIS and reduce the active population and external supporters.
Exploiting change in gender roles is a potential opportunity. As demonstrated in the LTTE and Chechen case studies, gender roles and changes within them present instability with the active population. ISIS adheres to strict gender roles. Women have no place in direct action roles. In fact, ISIS fighters fear women combatants, as is evident with Kurdish women fighters. 48 While it may not be feasible to create an all-female ground force to conduct an assault, information operations and selective deployment of such units may garner high operational effectiveness in coalition ground efforts. Additionally, ISIS exploits marriage to serve their own purpose by allowing captured women to marry and divorce ISIS fighters multiple times a day for sex. 49 While ISIS deliberately uses this practice as a tactic for control of members and the population, this practice simply capitalizes on a Sharia technicality that allows ISIS men to avoid punishment for adultery and fornication. Information operations campaigns aimed at exploiting these actions would serve to stem the international and regional support for ISIS and destabilize their organization and goals.
Finally, exploiting change in social structure is a potential opportunity. As discussed 
Conclusion
Cultures, once faced with an antagonist exercising different cultural views, will either adapt their own patterns of restraint or take extraordinary efforts to enforce the original norms.
Even more so if the balance of power is unequal and the conflict trends towards asymmetric warfare. The concept of reciprocity typically applies to peers or near peers in conflict with similar risk and cost concerns. Reciprocity does not naturally apply to mismatched opponents, as is the case with insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, when faced with a single aspect such as an organized pattern of restraint, the concept of reciprocity absolutely applies. This can be a single point of contention between opponents. Patterns of restraint between two parties, regardless of state or non-state, peer or near-peer, will only change if the group is not organized, lacks leadership, and lacks long-term goals. The only exception to this is when a change in restraint results in a strategic improvement for the cause and even this induces risk toward the cause. Change in restraint is vulnerability. It shows a weakness in the social and moral structure of the group. Those groups that adapt to change must transition quickly or risk exploitation.
Those groups that do not adapt will either internally unravel or their opposition will overwhelm them. In all cases, it is vitally important to recognize patterns of restraint in order to identify change when it does happen, on both sides. Change in patterns of restraint will risk alienating active and inactive populations, giving the opportunity for the antagonist to exploit the vulnerability. The most advantageous way to exploit enemy patterns of restraint is to take the advantage when the antagonist's risk is highest, during the period when they change their values.
